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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS TERMINABLE AT
WILL: MONGE v. BEEBE RUBBER CO.
AND BAD FAITH DISCHARGES
Introduction
Approximately ninety percent of the labor force in the
United States can be classified as wage or salary earners.1 With
declining opportunities for self-employment, 2 America has be-
come a "nation of employees." '3 "[The] dependence of the
mass of the people upon others for all their income is something
new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in
another man's hands."
4
For most American workers this dependency is absolute
because of the rule that in employment contracts of indefinite
duration the employer has an absolute right of discharge;5 a
right that may be exercised by an employer for a good cause, a
bad cause,' "or even for a cause morally wrong. ' Such a rule
vests in an employer an enormous power subject to abuse. It
was partially in response to "abusive" discharges that Congress
enacted the National Labor Relations Act8 which prohibited
employers from exercising the right of discharge as a means of
intimidation and coercion against union organizing activity.'
This limitation on the employer's ordinary prerogative was
deemed justified because the "employee is sensitive and re-
sponsive to even the most subtle expression on the part of the
' See REPORT OF SPECIAL TASK FORCE To SECRETARY OF HEW, WORK n AMmicA 20-
23 (1972).
2 Id. "In the middle of the 19th century, less than half of all employed people were
wage and salary workers. By 1950 it was 80%, and by 1970, 90%." Id.
3 F. TANNENAUM, A PILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
'Id.
'Notes 16 and 17 infra and accompanying text.
£ Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1970); E.W.Bliss Co. v.
Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 1969); Feamster v. Southern Ry.
Co., 49 F.R.D. 26, 27 (M.D.N.C. 1969); Wilkinson v. Trust Co. of Georgia Associates,
197 S.E.2d 146, 148 (Ga. App. 1973); Weiss v. Opportunities for Cortland County, Inc.,
337 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (App. Div. 1972); Laiken v. American Bank & Trust Co., 308
N.Y.S.2d 111, 112 (App. Div. 1970); Scruggs v. George A. Hormel & Co., 464 S.W.2d
730, 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
7 Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled
on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1970).
See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1937).
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employer, whose good will is so necessary."' 0 There has, how-
ever, been no extension of the principles of the N.L.R.A. to
other types of abusive discharges, although a number of writers
have called for such action." Consequently, the majority of
American workers serve at the whim of their employers, and
are subject to abusive discharges without legal recourse.
Against the background of this almost universally ac-
cepted common law right of absolute discharge stands the re-
cent case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company. 2 Therein, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, boldly disregarding estab-
lished precedent, held that malicious, bad faith, or retaliatory
discharges are against public policy and constitute breaches of
at-will employment contracts. As will be seen, this decision is
not without substantial legal foundation and may well serve as
the catalyst for a further judicial re-evaluation of this area of
the law.
The Origins of the Terminable-at-Will Doctrine
An employment contract may be either expressly or im-
pliedly for a definite term, in which case the courts will enforce
the intentions of the parties. 3 However, when the duration of
employment is neither expressed nor implied,' the employ-
" NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713, 722 (3rd Cir. 1939). Less than twenty-
five percent of American workers are members of unions, whose contracts with man-
agement typically contain provisions that employees shall be discharged only for just
cause. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1404, 1410 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Blades].
" See generally Blades, supra note 10; Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: U.S.
Report, 18 Ru S L. Ryv. 428 (1964); Blumrosen, Workers'Rights Against Employers
and Unions: Justice Francis-A Judge for Our Season, 24 Rurosm L. REv. 480 (1970);
Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 1015 (1970); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rv.
335 (1974).
12 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
'" See 9 S. WmuisToN, A TRFATMSE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRACTs § 1017 at 127 (3rd
ed. W. Jaeger 1967) [hereinafter cited as WmLisTON]. See, e.g., Gambrel v. U.M.W.,
249 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. 1952); Putman v. Producers' Live Stock Marketing Ass'n, 75
S.W.2d 1075 (Ky. 1934); Little v. Federal Container Corp., 452 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn.
App. 1969).
4 Although courts were formerly usually unwilling to look beyond the express
terms of a contract to determine whether a fixed term was implied under the circum-
stances, during the past thirty years they have been more inclined to do so. See
Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 RuToans L. Rav. 428, 431-33 (1964)
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ment is understood to be for an indefinite period and is termin-
able at will by either the employer or the employee. 15 Until
recently, this rule was universal" and without exception. 7
The "terminable-at-will" doctrine in employment con-
tracts is peculiar to America. The English rule is that a general
hiring (roughly equivalent to an indefinite hiring) is for one
year. 8 Thus, the contract is for a specific period and the inten-
tions of the parties are enforced. The American rule originated
with a late nineteenth century treatise which was quickly cited
and followed by American courts, often with no justification or
analysis. 9 The author of the treatise, H. G. Wood, in stating
the employment-at-will rule, said:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite
hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks
to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
[hereinafter cited as Blumrosen]. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Mayerson v. Washington Mfg. Co.,
58 F.R.D. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Wilson v. Haughton, 266 S.W.2d 115 (Ky. 1954); Still
v. Lance, 182 S.E.2d 403 (N.C. 1971); School Comm. of Providence v. Bd. of Regents
for Educ., 308 A.2d 788 (R.I. 1973). See generally 1 WmLsToN § 39 at 117. A minority
of courts have been willing to find, where no duration is expressed, an implied term of
employment in contracts where a periodic pay rate is specified. In such cases the courts
have found an implied term of employment equal to the pay period. Where the pay
period specification is taken to imply a contract for that period, an employee has a
cause of action if terminated without cause. However, the majority of courts have
concluded that pay period specifications relate only to pay rates and imply nothing
about the duration of employment. The logical conclusion of the majority opinion is
that since no term is specified the employment is at will. See generally Annot., 161
A.L.R. 706, 707 (1946); Annot., 100 A.L.R. 834 (1936); Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469 (1921).
s See 9 WLLSTON § 1017 at 129.
" Representative cases handed down within the last ten years which have reaf-
firmed the rule are: NLRB v. Local No. 4, Hoisting and Portable Eng'rs, 456 F.2d 242
(1st Cir. 1972); Estate of Porter v. Comm'r, 442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1971); Hanna v. RCA
Serv. Co., 336 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Cales v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 300 F.
Supp. 155 (W.D. Va. 1969); Mayerson v. Washington Mfg. Co., 58 F.R.D. 377 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); White v. Strange, 237 So. 2d 16 (Fla. App. 1970); Stegall v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
197 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. App. 1973); Donahue v. Rockford Showcase & Fixture Co., 230
N.E.2d 278 (Ill. App. 1967); Garner v. State Bd. of Educ., 277 So. 2d 492 (La. App.
1973); Lundeen v. Cozy Cab Mfg. Co., 179 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 1970); School Comm. v.
Bd. of Regents for Educ., 308 A.2d 788 (R.I. 1973); Little v. Federal Container Corp.,
452 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. App. 1969); NHA, Inc. v. Jones, 500 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973); Lukens v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607 (Wyo. 1967). 1
'1 Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) represents the sole
exception.
IS See Annot., 161 A.L.R. 706, 708 (1946).
" See Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 476 (1921).
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establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month,
or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and
no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only
at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve."
Wood cited only four American cases, 2' none of which sup-
ported his thesis.22 His statement of the employment-at-will
rule, in spite of its dubious accuracy, spread widely and quickly
and is today the "standard text statement of the common
law."23
Several writers attribute *judicial receptivity to the doc-
trine to the sociological, political and economic ideologies that
prevailed toward the end of the nineteenth century (i.e.,
laissez-faire,24 free enterprise,2 and individualism 26 ). A thor-
" H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
21 Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S.
254 (1871); DeBriar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106
Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
2 For a discussion of these cases see Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 476 (1921).
2 Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 432. The pervasiveness of the rule is illustrated
by what one commentator has called its "most pernicious use"-limiting permanent
employment contracts to "terminable at will" contracts. Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 345 (1974). The same year Wood's treatise
was published, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided in Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky.
541 (1877), that a minister's "permanent" employment was actually intended by the
parties to continue only until one of them desired to terminate it. This application of
the rule has increased to the point that today the majority of American courts construe
permanent or lifetime contracts as "being an agreement at will, terminable by either
party at his election." 9 WMUSTON § 1017, at 131. Courts will not find a "permanent"
contract enforceable unless the employee can show that he gave some consideration
in addition to his services. This rule is evidenced by the following language in Edwards
v. Kentucky Util. Co., 150 S.W.2d 916, 917-18 (Ky. 1941): "A universally recognized
rule of law is that a contract for permanent employment which is not supported by
any consideration other than the obligation of services to be performed on the one hand
and wages to be paid on the other is a contract for an indefinite period, and, as such,
is terminable at the will of either party." Accord, Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188
N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971).
21 See Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political
Rights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015 (1970).
21 See Blumrosen, Worker's Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice
Francis-A Judge for Our Season, 24 Ru'rozEs L. REv. 480, 481 (1970).
2' See Rodes, Due Process & Social Legislation in the Supreme Court-A Post
Mortem, 33 NoTR DAm LAW. 5 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Rodes]. Freedom of the
individual was still a revolutionary concept to which the country was strongly attached
emotionally and philosophically. The commitment was so strong that the courts were
unwilling to uphold social legislation that restricted individual freedom. Id. In particu-
lar, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional statutory limitations on
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oughly individualistic socio-economic worldview so dominated
American consciousness in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century that it was automatically a major premise for judges
when they reviewed employment contracts. The doctrine of
complete freedom of contract was a useful tool for maintaining
this perspective. Indeed, the notion of complete freedom of
contract is at the root of the terminable-at-will doctrine.Y
"[Tihe last statement of the unadulterated individualist
position" and the "high water .mark of the laissez-faire doc-
trine, 2 19 is contained in Coppage v. Kansas"0 where the Su-
preme Court held that a state may not statutorily forbid the
"yellow-dog" contract (i.e., it may not forbid an employer from
discharging the employee for union activity). The Court found
that an employer's right to hire and fire at will was a constitu-
tionally protected property right. Implicit in the opinion is the
idea that the exclusive right of the employer and the employee
to determine the terms of employment must remain undis-
turbed by the courts or legislatures. The Court's belief that the
doctrine of freedom of contract ought to prevail even in the face
of a marked disparity of bargaining power is demonstrated by
the following language:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there
must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally
happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not
equally unhampered by circumstances .... [S]ince it is
self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some
persons must have more property than others, it is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and
the right of private property without at the same time recog-
nizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the
necessary result of the exercise of those rights."
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, referred to the
"equality of bargaining position at which freedom of contract
an employer's right to discharge an employee. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
2 Blades, supra note 10 at 1416.
2 Rodes, supra note 26 at 13.
"Id. at 12.
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
"1 Id. at 17.
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
begins,13 2 but the Court was not yet ready to accept his posi-
tion.
"Mutuality of Obligation" and Consideration
Economic policies may have fostered initial acceptance of
the terminable-at-will rule, but traditional contract principles
nurtured it and insured its survival to the present. One com-
mentator has sadly concluded: "In the last analysis, then, it is
not policy but the technical difficulty of relaxing the rather
rigid rules of consideration which makes it unlikely that the
employer's right to terminate the at will employment relation-
ship can be limited under contract law."33
Originally the doctrine of "mutuality of obligation" was
invoked to sanction discharges without cause in indefinite or
permanent contracts of employment. That mutuality of obliga-
tion is necessary is one of the most commonly repeated state-
ments known to the law of contracts. "Both parties to a con-
tract must be bound or neither is bound."" If the employee is
not bound to give services for any specific length of time, then
neither can the employer be required to continue to employ. In
Adair v. United States,3 5 the Supreme Court said that "the
right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for
whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for
whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such em-
ployee.""
Although "mutuality of obligation" is an attractive doc-
trine because it "seems to connote equality, fairness, and jus-
tice,"'37 it is simply not true that both parties to a contract must
be bound or neither is bound. Courts have long recognized and
enforced unilateral and option contracts in which one of the
32 Id. at 27.
' Blades, supra note 10 at 1421 (emphasis added).
3 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRAcTS § 152 at 2 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN]. See,
e.g., Storm v. United States, 94 U.S. 76 (1876); Meadows v. Radio Indus., 222 F.2d
347 (7th Cir. 1955); Lord v. Goldberg, 22 P. 1126 (Cal. 1889); Rape v. Mobile & O.R.R.,
100 So. 585 (Miss. 1924); Rich v. Doneghey, 177 P. 86 (Okla. 1918); Kiser v. Amalgam-
ated Clothing Workers, 194 S.E. 727 (Va. 1938).
208 U.S. 161 (1908).
I Id. at 174-75.
1A CORBIN § 152 at 2-3.
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parties is clearly never bound to do anything." However, in
unilateral and option contracts both parties do confer a benefit
or suffer a detriment (i.e., give consideration). It is now gener-
ally agreed 3l by the courts" and the treatise writers4" that the
phrase "mutuality of obligation" has been confused" with and
can mean no more than that contracts require a mutuality of
consideration. One text writer says flatly: "[T]he misleading
notion that both parties must be 'bound' must be dispensed
with. . . .[Tihe supposed requirement of mutuality of obli-
gation is merely one of mutuality of consideration: Each con-
tracting party must supply consideration to the other." 3 The
Restatement emphatically states that if the requirement of
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of
"mutuality of obligation."44
The equating of mutuality of obligation with mutuality of
consideration brings into focus the real obstacle to enforcement
of indefinite employment contracts-consideration.45 When an
-4 "If mutuality, in a broad sense, were held to be an essential element in every
valid contract to the extent that both contracting parties could sue on it, there could
be no such thing as a valid unilateral or option contract. Such contracts have long been
recognized as valid contracts. . . ."Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Continen-
tal Can Co., 133 N.E. 714 (Ill. 1921); "'Both parties must be bound or neither is
bound.' That statement is obviously erroneous as applied to an exchange of promise
for performance. . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81, Comment F (1969)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
In a unilateral contract a promise is given in exchange for a performance instead
of for a promise as in a bilateral contract. At no time, in a unilateral contract, is a
promisee bound to give performance. Even after performance is begun the promisee is
free to terminate his performance-he had made no promise. After he gives perform-
ance, he is not obligated to do anything more, although at this point the promisor is
legally bound to honor his promise. Thus, in an unilateral contract, before performance
no one is bound; after performance by the promisee only the promisor is bound. There
is no mutuality of obligation, yet the contract is enforceable. Likewise, in an option
contract where there is an executed consideration and a right to receive a performance,
only one of the parties is ever bound. See generally 1 WILLISTON § 13.
3, In the past decade courts have rarely mentioned mutuality of obligation. For
an exception in the context of employment contracts see Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co.,
428 F.2d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1970).
11 See, e.g., Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3rd Cir. 1924);
Lewis v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 37 N.W.2d 316, 325 (Iowa 1949).
" See 1 WLLISTON § 105A; 1A CORBIN § 152 (1963).
42 For an example of a hopeless confusion of "mutuality of obligation" with consid-
eration see Hablas v. Armour and Co., 270 F.2d 71, 78-79 (8th Cir. 1959).
"J.CALwm & J. Pzmuo, CONTRACTS 131 (1970).
" See RESTATEMENT § 81.
See Blades, supra note 10, at 1420.
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employee is not obligated to work for a definite period of time
due to an express or implied option to cancel, his promise to
render services is illusory and the employment contract is
unenforceable.46
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,47 decided in 1974, broke with
traditional common law theory and found an abusive discharge
in an employment contract of indefinite duration to be a
breach of contract and against public policy. The plaintiff in
Monge, a married woman, refused to be "nice" to her foreman
by "going out" with him. Thereafter she was demoted in job
grade and pay level; eventually, after work absences due to
illness, she was discharged. A jury found that the discharge was
prompted by her refusal to "go out" with her foreman and
awarded her $2,500 damages. On appeal, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court acknowledged the common law rule of
terminability-at-will of employment contracts of indefinite
duration, but maintained there was a "new climate prevailing
generally in the relationship of employer and employee"48
which demands a tri-lateral balancing of (1) the interest of the
employer in running his business as he sees fit, (2) the em-
ployee's interest in maintaining his employment and (3) the
public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the
two. The court held that:
A termination by the employer of a contract of employment
at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice, or based
on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic sys-
tem or the public good and constitutes a breach of the em-
ployment contract.4
The rationale of the court is contained within this single
46 "An agreement wherein one party reserves the right to cancel at his pleasure
cannot create a contract." 1 WIWSTON § 105, at 418; "The consideration was a promise
for a promise. But the appellant did not promise to do anything, and could at any time
cancel the contract. According to the great weight of authority such a contract is
unenforceable." Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F. 693, 694
(5th Cir. 1924) (commercial contract); accord, RESTATEMENT § 79.
47 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).




paragraph. Two things are said about a bad faith termination
by an employer: (1) it "is not in the best interest of the eco-
nomic system or the public good" (i.e., it is against public
policy), and (2) it "constitutes a breach of the employment
contract." It is uncertain whether the court thought a bad faith
discharge is a breach of contract because it is against public
policy, or whether the policy considerations are unnecessary to
the finding of a breach of contract.
The court does not explain how its holding satisfies the
requirements of consideration. This is surprising in view of
nearly a century of American cases which have unanimously
held that indefinite qmployment contracts fail precisely be-
cause of a lack of consideration, or, as the older cases say, be-
cause of a lack of mutuality of obligation. On first reading of
Monge, the suspicion is all but unavoidable that the court de-
liberately sidestepped this issue. On closer examination, how-
ever, a strong argument can be made that the court satisfied
the technical requirement of consideration by finding good
faith to be an implied term in employment contracts. It is of
paramount importance to focus on the court's finding that bad
faith, malicious, or retaliatory discharges constitute breaches
of contract. By negative implication, it may be inferred that a
bad faith termination is a breach of contract precisely because
good faith termination was a term of the employment contract.
It is unclear whether the court thought good faith termination
was a term actually (although implicitly) agreed to by the par-
ties, or a constructive condition imposed on the contract on
public policy grounds.
Good Faith as Consideration
Regardless of the approach the Monge court intended,
good faith, promised as a condition precedent to termination,
constitutes consideration. Before and after entering into an at-
will employment contract both the employer and employee are
completely free to employ, or not employ, to work, or not work.
A promise to employ, or not employ, which is in effect the
promise an employer makes in an at-will contract, is illusory
since the employer is actually promising nothing. However,
when an employer (either expressly, implicitly, or as a matter
of law) promises to employ and to discharge only in good faith,
1975]
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his promise is no longer illusory,0 or rather, it is no longer
wholly discretionary. Because the employer has by his promise
given up a right to discharge for any reason and has limited
himself to good faith discharges, he has suffered a legal detri-
ment which constitutes consideration. Agreements to employ
or to give services with options to cancel in good faith consti-
tute alternative promises, each having value.-' It is legally in-
consequential that a promise of good faith termination consti-
tutes minimal consideration. Courts have not favored contracts
cancellable at will and have generally responded by finding the
most nominal obligation sufficient consideration to bind a bar-
gain.52 By finding that good faith is an implied term in every
employment contract, the court in Monge both supplied a valid
consideration (although nominal) sufficient to render the con-
tract enforceable and prohibited abusive discharges.
Prior to 1970, the cases were in agreement that good faith
was not a condition of an employment contract unless expressly
agreed to by the parties. It was consistently held that "[i]t
makes no difference if the employer had a bad motive"" in
See J. CALAiAUU & J. PERILLO, CoNTACTs 139 (1970).
, See RESTATEMENT § 79.
12 See 1 WILLISTON § 105. For example, in "satisfaction" contracts, when the
parties agree that an employee is to continue working so long as his services are
"satisfactory," the contract is not too indefinite for enforcement. The satisfaction
requirement renders the contract not terminable at will. The employer may only dis-
charge if he is dissatisfied with the employee's services and the dissatisfaction must
be in good faith. Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1497, 1499 (1920). It must be actual and not
pretended. Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). The
courts are usually not concerned with whether the employer's dissatisfaction is reason-
able, so long as it is genuine, and not capricious, nor prompted by bad faith. Kramer
v. Philadelphia Leather Goods Corp., 73 A.2d 385 (Pa. 1950). In recent years some
courts have applied a reasonable man test to determine whether an employer's dissat-
isfaction is genuine. Stevens v. G.L. Rugo & Sons, Inc., 209 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1953).
Another example of a nominal consideration which some courts have held consti-
tutes valid consideration is a notice provision in an employment contract. Where the
parties agree the contract is cancellable at will upon notice, it has been held that such
notice constitutes sufficient consideration to make the contract enforceable. Sylvan
Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 1945): "[IThe
United States promised by implication to take and pay for the trap rock or give notice
of cancellation within a reasonable time. The alternative of giving notice was not
difficult of performance, but it was a sufficient consideration to support the contract."
" See cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra.
" Mallard v. Boring,6 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); "precisely as may
the employe cease labor at his whim or pleasure and, whatever be his reason, good,
bad, or indifferent, leave no one a legal right to complain; so, upon the other hand,
COMMENTS
discharging an employee. In a 1960 California case, Mallard v.
Boring,5 5 a court wrestled with public policy considerations, as
did the court in Monge, but decided that pronouncement of
policy was the province of the legislature. The case concerned
a plaintiff who was discharged from an "at will" employment
contract because she made herself available for jury duty. The
court held bad faith irrelevant, given the present status of the
law, and said that even though it might consider it bad policy
to permit such discharges, "we feel it [finding such discharges
against public policy] should be done by the legislature."5 The
court in Monge was not so timid, but many other courts are
likely to agree with the California court's conclusion that pub-
lic policy pronouncements are not within the province of the
judiciary.
Two recent New York cases found good faith to be an
implied term of the employment contract without resorting to
public policy considerations. In Reale v. International Business
Machines Corp.," the plaintiff alleged a maliciously motivated
discharge from his employment contract which was for a defi-
nite term. The court found that the defendant employer should
have been granted summary judgment, since the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate an "exclusive malicious motivation" on
the part of the employer. "Plaintiff was bound to present proofs
tending to exclude any motive other than a desire on the part
of the defendants to cause harm to the plaintiff."59 Apparently
the court would tolerate malice if there was also a just cause
for the plaintiff's discharge, but the implication is clear that an
exclusively malicious motivation in discharging an employee
would give him a cause of action for breach of contract.
In Zimmer v. Wells Management Corp., 0 the plaintiff
employee entered into a stock transaction and escrow agree-
may the employer discharge, and, whatever be his reason, good, bad, or indifferent,
no one has suffered a legal wrong." Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood
Lumber Co., 112 P. 886, 888 (Cal. 1910).
" 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
" Id. at 175.
-" Zimmer v. Wells Management Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Reale
v. International Business Machines Corp., 311 N.Y.S.2d 767 (App. Div. 1970).
311 N.Y.S.2d 767 (App. Div. 1970).
" Id. at 768.
348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
19751
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ment with his employer, whereby, after five years employment,
the stock was to be fully vested in the employee. Eight months
before the end of the five year term the plaintiff was fired
because he was not a "swinger" and did not "mix well". The
court held that while the employer was under no obligation to
continue the plaintiff's employment, in view of the stock trans-
action and escrow agreement, the employers "did have a duty
to deal with him in good faith in reaching their decision as to
whether or not to renew and continue his employment. This is
clearly what the contract contemplated."' As in Reale, the
court made no mention of public policy, but in imposing the
requirement of good faith on the contract it saw itself as merely
effectuating the intentions of the parties. Although the facts
peculiar to Zimmer may make it likely that the parties to the
contract contemplated good faith and fair dealing, it is never-
theless arguable that the parties to an ordinary industrial em-
ployment contract also expect fair treatment.62
Although the issue of terminability may never arise in a
job interview and the employee never consciously thinks about
the matter, it is reasonable to suppose that the employee tac-
itly assumes he will be dealt with in all matters, fairly and in
good faith including his discharge. Courts should enforce these
' Id. at 542.
62 See Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 433. The employment relationship has been
altered dramatically since the terminable-at-will rule was formulated and since the
United States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) and
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) struck down state legislation which prohibited
an employer from discharging an employee for union organizational activity. The
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1970), now prohibits such dis-
charges. Other statutes forbid discrimination in hiring or discharge based on: age, see
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970); race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)-(e) (2); and veterans are assured their former employment, see Universal
Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 459 (c) (1970). Additionally, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. 1974) provides that a minimum wage
be paid to covered employees.
The changing legal climate has fostered new expectations of the employment
relationship on the part of employees. See generally H. VoLLnm, EMPLOYEE RIGHM AND
THE EMPLOYmENT RELATioNsnm 142-47 (1960). There has been a renaissance of expecta-
tions of good faith in all types of contracts. See generally Newman, Renaissance of
Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-American Law, 54 CORNELL L. Rav. 533 (1969).
This has been influenced, perhaps, by Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203 which states




tacit assumptions as part of the contract the parties made. 3 In
employment and commercial contracts, "[m]en must be able
to assume that those with whom they deal in the general inter-
course of society will act in good faith."6 The question is
whether men actually do make such assumptions. Arguably,
contracting parties do and it is natural for them to do so. 5
When parties agree to an "at will" cancellation agreement in
a contract each "presumably agrees merely to the grant of a
power, and not also to the grant of a power to abuse that
power."66 It strains credulity to picture an employee con-
sciously bestowing on an employer the right to abusively or
maliciously discharge him,6" particularly if the employment
will confer seniority, pension, or other cumulative benefits.
The question of terminability never specifically arises in
most at-will contracts. The parties do not usually expressly
agree that the employment is cancellable at will. On the con-
trary, the at-will aspect of an employment contract is usually
a by-product of the failure of the parties to expressly provide
for a definite term, which raises the strong presumption, ac-
cording to the common law, that the parties intended the con-
tract to be at-will.6 8 If it is true that prospective employees do
not consciously grant their employers a power of abusive dis-
charge, then it is certainly true that neither do they do so
unconsciously. In short, the court in Monge could have avoided
the matter of public policy, if it had chosen to do so, by simply
announcing that in requiring a good faith discharge, it was
merely enforcing what must have been the intentions of the
parties.
Consideration-A Nonessential?
It was earlier suggested that a first reading of Monge indi-
See generally L. Fuuza & R. BRAucHmn, BAsic CoNTRAcT LAw, 554-59 (1964) (on
the role of tacit assumptions in contracts).
1R. PoUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THz PHmOSOPHY OF LAW 188 (1922).
'3 See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provision
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 198 (1968).
"Id. at 251 n.222.
"No reasonable contracting party would place himself in a position where an
adverse party could effectuate a forfeiture of his valuable rights. . . ." for a trivial
reason. Zimmer v. Wells Management Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
" Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 N.W.2d 587 (Wis. 1967).
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cates the court deliberately avoided the issue (and hence the
traditional requirement) of consideration. Perhaps this is ex-
actly what the court did, focusing instead upon either the in-
tentions of the parties, or the demands of public policy as the
court discerned them. It may have viewed good faith as a judi-
cial tool for achieving justice, which no traditional contract
theory could have accomplished without fictionalizing existing
law. 9 If this was the approach intended, it has support in re-
cent cases. In Eilen v. Tappins, Inc.,7" the employee alleged a
"permanent" contract which is ordinarily terminable at will
unless the employee gives "additional" consideration over and
above his services. Instead of following the unyielding rule of
the common law demanding "additional" consideration, the
court saw the rule as merely a guide for judges-a safeguard
designed to insure that courts carefully scrutinize permanent
employment contracts to determine whether the parties ac-
tually intended permanent employment. Thus, Ellen focuses
on the intent of the parties, and views the requirement of addi-
tional consideration expendable where its enforcement would
clearly frustrate that intent. The same sentiment was ex-
pressed in dictum in Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas,
Inc. ,72 where the court said: "The rule [of additional considera-
tion] is arguably too mechanical an answer to the more basic
issue of ascertaining the real intent of the parties."
The bluntest attack on the rule of "additional considera-
tion" to date came in the recent case, Drzewiecki v. H. & R.
Block, Inc. ," in which the court advocated the avoidance of
"mechanical and arbitrary tests" and said that the court's pri-
11 See Summers, supra note 65, at 198. Good faith is part of a family of legal
doctrines which performs the function of furthering the:
Most fundamental policy objectives of any legal system-justice, and justice
according to law. By invoking good faith. . . it may be possible for a judge
to do justice and do it according to law. Without legal resources of this
general nature he might, in a particular case, be unable to do justice at all,
or he might be able to do it only at the cost of fictionalizing existing legal
concepts and rules, thereby snarling up the law for future cases. In begetting
snarl, fiction may introduce inequity, unclarity or unpredictability.
Id. at 198.
70 83 A.2d 817 (N.J. Super. 1951). See Blumrosen, supra note 25, at 482.
11 For a discussion of "permanent" contracts see note 23 supra.
72 200 N.W.2d 155, 161 (Minn. 1972).
71 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972).
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mary duty was to construe contracts to give effect to the intent
of the parties "as demonstrated by the language used, the pur-
pose to be accomplished and the circumstances under which
the agreement was made.17
These three cases illustrate that the traditional technical
requirements of consideration may be waived where failing to
do so would create an injustice or frustrate the intent of the
parties. Enforceable contracts founded upon "illusory" prom-
ises (which lack value and therefore do not constitute consider-
ation) are not unprecedented. Courts have upheld such con-
tracts where doing so has served the ends of public policy. For
example, an infant's promise in a contract with an adult is
voidable 5 (i.e., cancellable at will and thus illusory) by the
infant, but not by the adult. The Restatement, in attempting
to rationalize infants' contracts with the general rule that
promides cancellable at will are illusory7 makes the interesting
statement that: "The value [of a promise] is not necessarily
affected adversely by the fact that no legal remedy will be
available in the event of its breach. ' 77 The better view is that
infants' contracts are simply exceptions to the generally applic-
able rules of consideration.7"
The Monge court may have found on the basis of different
but equally compelling public policies that at-will employment
contracts are also exceptions to the normal rules of considera-
tion (i.e., although cancellable and illusory, nevertheless en-
forceable). Although not expressly framed in policy terms, this
is likewise the practical effect of Drzewieckil and to a more
limited extent Eilen"° and Bussard,s' in the area of permanent
employment contracts.
11 Id. at 174. In particular, the court said the "general rule requiring additional
consideration is a rule of construction, not of substance and that a contract for perma-
nent employment, whether or not it is based upon some consideration other than the
employee's services, cannot be terminated at the will of the employer if it contains an
express or implied condition to the contrary." Id.
75 See 1 WnMUSTON § 15.
79 RESTATEmENT § 79. "The value of a promise depends on its terms and on the
probability it will be performed." Id.
7 RESTATEmENT § 80.
11 See 1 WILLSTON § 105.
11 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972).
- 83 A.2d 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1951).




At the turn of the century the employer ruled the work
place with an iron hand. His strength lay primarily in the com-
mon law rule which rendered most employment contracts "at
will." Over the past forty years the employer's power over his
employees has been steadily eroded by the emergence of labor
unions and a growing body of legislation. Although Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co. is a noteworthy break with well settled com-
mon law principles, its appearance is not surprising in view of
the changing legal climate in employer-employee relationships.
Employees do expect to be dealt with in good faith, especially
when the question of termination arises. Monge gives those
expectations the force of law by incorporating them into the
employment contract.
Abusive discharges in indefinite employment contracts
have been litigated repeatedly in the past. There is every rea-
son to believe they will be litigated in the future. In the interest
of justice and in the interest of validating the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties, the courts should find that such dis-
charges constitute breaches of contract. As the foregoing dis-
cussion demonstrates, the legal theories necessary to achieve
that result are available.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court was anxious to say
that it did not intend to interfere with the normal right of an
employer to discharge. Outrageous, unconscionable, or abusive
discharges are not "normal," and Monge holds that they con-
stitute breaches of contract, whether or not the employment
was for a definite term. The rationale for the court's holding is
uncertain. It may have viewed the requirement of considera-
tion as a rule of construction rather than substance. In this
view, a judge is to look more closely to determine the intent'of
the parties in the absence of consideration. Or, the court may
have thought the answer to the question of consideration was
implicit in its holding. By finding good faith in, or by imposing
it on, the employment contract, the requirement of considera-
tion was technically satisfied.
It is true that the vast majority of current cases differ toto
caelo with Monge. Those cases are based on precedents formu-
lated a century ago; a millenium ago in terms of the changes
that have occurred in the "master-servant" relationship. "[I]t
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is a ridiculous waste of time to cite precedents from the time
of the Statute of Laborers; it is hardly less so to cite precedents
from the nineteenth century or from the first quarter of the
twentieth.""2 "The tide has most definitely turned. It is fruit-
less to speak in terms of weight of authority where it is evident
that new approaches are firmly taking hold."
Terry Sellars
u 3A CORIN § 674 at 207.
0 J. CA~wm & J. PmutO, CoNTuaCs 134 (1970).

